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Abstract
This paper explores the role of ﬁrm boundaries by abstracting from the property rights
approach, which is not applicable to the increasingly important human-capital intensive
ﬁrms. By focusing on ﬁrm boundaries’ role as ‘information barriers’ that blur employees’
individual outside identities, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms boundaries matter because they can alter
investment speciﬁty and hence alleviate or aggravate the hold-up problem. Speciﬁcally,
when there is substantial investment externalities integration is more eﬃcient, and con-
versely separation is more eﬃcient when investment externality is small. This main result
is obtained under both Nash and alternating-oﬀer bargaining, while optimal organization
structure is characterized under the former. Finally, we also examine the eﬀect of relational
∗I thank Hongbin Cai, Stephen Chiu, David Levine, John Riley, and participants of the Theory Proseminar
at UCLA, Hong Kong University, Lingnan University for helpful commands. All errors are mine.
1contracts and show that organization structures matter even when relational contracts can
be signed.
1 Introduction
What diﬀerence does it make when a group of people work as one integrated ﬁrm instead of
several separated ﬁrms? Common sense suggests that integration will facilitate better corporation
among the group. This implies that there is externalities — one people’s payoﬀ depends on the
actions of some other people. However, why does people behave diﬀerently when they belong
to the same ﬁrm, aside from trivial reasons such as being physically closer to each other or
psychological reason such as feeling as a big family? In this paper, we focus on a commonly
observed phenomenon — when people join a ﬁrm they lose, to some extent, their individual
identity to their customers so latter on if they were to decide to leave the ﬁrm, outside customers
can not judge them soly by their individual performance (because the customers are not sure
what their contributions are) instead each employee will be judged together with the rest of the
ﬁrm. From this information-barriers perspective, we build a human-side theory of the ﬁrm and
ﬁnd that integration can alleviate hold-up problems when investment externalities are big and
aggravate the problems when externalities are small.
It is commonly observed that when a group of people work together they intentionally blur
their individual identities. For example, academic papers in economics are often published with
t h ea u t h o r s ’n a m el i s t e di na l p h a b e t i c a lo r d e ri n s t e a do fr a n k e db ye a c ha u t h o r ’ sc o n t r i b u t i o n
(Engers et al [3]). In industries, labor markets often can only recognize workers by the name of
the ﬁrm they work for instead their true value because the common name of the ﬁrm, instead
2individual workers’ name, are used to claim success or failure. For example, the managers of
General Electric are often consider good managers by outside market sometime regardless their
real abilities, whereas consultants or auditors of Author Anderson ﬁnds themselves hard to ﬁnd a
job elsewhere after the scandal of Enron even they are not related to the scandal. In addition to
individual workers, the identify of a segment of a ﬁrm are often aﬀected by the rest of the ﬁrm.
For example, EDS is recognized to have an expertise in automotive industry because it was once
owned by General Motor. After EDS is separated from General Motor, this recognition helped
EDS winning a 10 year extensive contract with Rolls-Royce’s in 1995. Although in some cases,
judging a worker by the ﬁrm he works for or a segment by the ﬁrm it belongs to might give one
a decent picture of its value, the important thing is that the picture is rarely 100% clear and,
more interestingly, in many cases the picture is very vague.
The observation above helps us to ﬁnd a new, human perspective to analyze the ﬁrm. In the
existing literature, the property right approach to the theory of the ﬁrm pioneered by Grossman
and Hart [4] and Hart and Moore [5] (henceforth GHM) has made a tremendous contribution in
helping us to understand the ﬁrms and appreciate the relevance of property rights. The general
theme of this literature is that, when contracts are incomplete, ownership of physical assets
matters because it can alter the marginal return to investment and hence change the investors’
incentive to invest1.B y d e ﬁning the ﬁrm as a collection of physical assets that it owns, this
approach has a particular strength in assessing the cost and beneﬁto fi n t e g r a t i o na n dd i ﬀerent
ownership structures. However, this focused view also make it lose sight of the human part of the
ﬁrms, which is of particular importance for human-capital intensive ﬁrms such as law, consulting,
1Under the Nash bargaining structure of Grossman and Hart[4] and Hart and Moore[5], ownership can enhance
manager’s investment incentives. Whereas, under the alternating-oﬀers bargaining structure of Chiu [2] and De
Meza and Lockwood [8], ownership can hinder manager’s investment incentives.
3medicine, investment banking, advertising and accounting ﬁrms. The obvious diﬃculty is that
human assets are inalienable and when one ﬁrm acquires the other the former does not own the
human assets of the latter. This problem has been noticed in the literature (Zingales[11]), and
some research has been devised to address it. For example Rajan and Zingales [9] and [10] deﬁne
the ﬁrm as a set of unique assets and a group of people who have access to these assets.
In the current paper, we made a bold conceptual departure from the property right approach
and deﬁne the ﬁrms in terms of people. In particular, we deﬁne a ﬁrm as a group of people who
work together in a close way that outsiders identify with the ﬁrm but not with individual employ-
ees. Put it another way, we assume the boundaries of the ﬁrms as ‘information garbling’ devises
that blur employees’ individual outside identities. By this deﬁnition, we ﬁnd that integration
is more eﬃcient when investment externalities are high (for example the value of one person’s
human capital increases rapidly with another person’s eﬀort) and negative when investment ex-
ternalities are low. This main result is obtained under both Nash (GHM) and alternating-oﬀer
(Chiu [2] and De Meza and Lockwood [8]) bargaining, two leading bargaining strucutres used
by the property right approach. Finally, we allow the investment game to be repeated so that
parties can sign ‘relational contracts’ as deﬁned by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] and examine
how organization structure, newly deﬁned in the current paper, aﬀect the feasibility of relational
contracts.
Certainly, externalities plays an important role in real-life mergers — the word ‘synergy’ has
been one of the most popular buzzwords used to justify mergers. From the standard, nonhuman-
asset perspective, the idea that integration can internalize externalities is very well-known. For
example, when two competing dualpolies are integrated and become one monopoly the joint
4producer surplus increases. The explanation of this standard perspective is trivial — integration
simply transform a multi-person game into a single-person decision problem. However, if we view
the ﬁrm as a group of people instead of assets, it is totally not clear why integration can internalize
externalities since the problem is always a multi-person game, before or after integration.
One of the most signiﬁcant mergers in business consulting is the one between IBM and Price-
waterhouseCoopers’ consulting practice (hence forth PwC). It is believed that this merger will
h e l pI B M ,w h o s em a j o rr e v e n u eu s e dt oc o m ef r o m selling hardware, to reinvent itself as a
high-level service provider. We will use the following imaginary story between IBM and PwC to
illustrate the idea of this paper. Suppose that there is a project that requires a new business strat-
egy (potentially from PwC) and a new computer system (potentially from IBM) to implement
the strategy. Imaginably, IBM’s investment in tailoring the computer system to ﬁtt h es t r a t e g y
has a big, positive externality on PwC’s outside identity (outside option) because it enhances
the impenetrability of PwC’s strategy even when the strategy is implemented with a computer
system provided by someone other than IBM. If PwC and IBM are two seperated ﬁrms, this
enhanced identity accrues only to PwC since the market knows clearly that PwC is responsible
for the strategy. On the other hand, if PwC and IBM are two segments of one integrated ﬁrm
X, the market will be not so clear about who is responsible for the strategy (imagine PwC and
IBM came to exist as one ﬁrm and on one knows about PwC and IBM individually. People only
know ﬁrm X as a whole.) In this case, IBM might be able to capture some of PwC’s identity ,
because if IBM were to be separated from PwC, people might think it is good at strategy, and
hence provide better incentive for IBM to invest.
With the famous holdup problem in the background and hence underinvestment always exists,
5integration will be optimal if it induce a lot more investment from IBM without forgoing too
much investment from PwC for losing it identity. Under situations where PwC’s investment also
has strong, positive externalities on IBM’s outside identity, the optimality for integration is even
more certain. However, separation can be optimal when externalities are small since sharing
outside identities can only dilute investment incentives.
T h el i t e r a t u r es p e c i ﬁcally on human-capital intensive ﬁrm is relatively thin. One recent
contribution is made by Levin and Tadelis [7] who address partnerships. The idea that personal
identity (or sometime termed as reputation) can be transferred has receive some attentions (for
example, Tadelis 99 AER and Mailath and Samuelson 01 RES) Also garbling information can
improve eﬃciency is obtained in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) on career concerns.
Investment externalities has been investigated by Che and Hausch 1999, De Fraja 1999, and Che
2000
The following of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an one-shot
investment game between two investors and the main results, which consider both Nash and
alternating-oﬀer bargaining structures. Section 3 considers the eﬀect of repeating the investment
game. Conclusion is in Section 4.
2 The One-shot (spot) investment game
2.1 Basic setup
A project requires the human capitals of two people A and B. Denote a ∈ R+ and b ∈ R+ as
the investments that A and B make in this project. The private marginal costs of investments
6are unity. Assume that the total value of the project is the sum of the values of A and B’s
human capitals and denote them as A(a,b) and B (a,b) respectively. Assume also that Aa > 0
and Bb > 0.T h i sr e ﬂects the idea that one person’s investment has a positive externality on the
other2. In addition, we assume that Aaa, Abb, Baa, Bbb < 0. Under the above setting, the ﬁrst
best investment which is a pair (a∗,b ∗) such that
(a
∗,b













To ﬁx idea, one could imagine that the primary project is to solve a particular business
problem that involves designing a new strategy and a new information technology, and A and
B are two consultants who respectively have expertise in strategy and information technology.
Quite possibly, A’s investment in the information technology can enhance B’s strategy and vise
versa.
The primary project requires both A and B to agree to use their human capitals in the project.
If they do, then a return which equals to A(a,b)+B (a,b) will be paid jointly to A and B3.I f
they do not agree, each of them can use his human capital independently in a secondary project.
However, the values of A and B’s human capitals will be discounted in their respective secondary
2For simplicity, we do not consider negative externalities.
3This assumption reﬂects situation where overall output is more readily observed than its components.
7projects because these secondary projects are less eﬃcient uses of their human capitals. As a
result the investments of A and B are relationship-speciﬁc, in the sense that they generate less
value when A and B break up. Denote the values of A and B’s human capitals in the secondary
projects as A(a,b) and B (a,b), respectively, and assume that A = φA and B = φB where
φ ∈ (0,1). The assumption that investment aﬀect both A(a,b) and B (a,b) and A(a,b) and
B (a,b) is to reﬂect that idea that people to build up valuable human capital is to be recognized
not only inside the ﬁrm but also outside of the ﬁrm (labor market).
To formulate the information-barrier role of ﬁrm boundaries, we allow A and B to choose
to not let the external labor market (which consists of potential customers of the secondary
projects) clearly identify their respective human capitals. Denote α ∈ [0,1] as the probability
the external labor market believes A is actually the owner her own human capital and β ∈ [0,1]
as the probability the external labor market believes B is actually the owner of his own human
capital. We deﬁne integration and separation as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A and B are integrated if α < 1 or β < 1 and say A and B are separated if α =1
and β =1 .
By this deﬁnition, we will have a continuum of diﬀerent types of integration and the diﬀerence
between separation and some type of integration (when α and β are very close to one) can be very
small. This deﬁnition allows us to parametrize all of possible organization structures (including
separation) by the belief of the external labor market. So, in the following, we will refer to
an organization structure with parameter (α,β) as O(α,β). Assuming that the external labor
market will pay A and B the estimated value of their respective human capitals based on the
market’s belief, A and B’s outside options under O(α,β) are αA+(1− β)B and (1 − α)A+βB
8respectively. In essence, the reservation value of one’s human capital become a mixture of the
value of human capitals of everyone in the ﬁrm depending how the boundaries of the ﬁrm is
setup, i.e. how α and β are chosen.4
A and B know that it is jointly more proﬁtable for them to agree on the primary project
but need to bargain over the joint return A(a,b)+B (a,b) after they invest. This introduces
the hold-up problem. In the following two section, we analyze the problem under two diﬀerent
bargaining structure: Nash bargaining and alternating-oﬀers bargaining.
2.2 Nash Bargaining
In this section, we assume A and B bargain over the total surplus, A(a,b)+B (a,b),i na5 0 -
50 Nash bargaining game with their payoﬀs in the external labor market as reservation values.
Given organization structure O(α,β),A ’ sp a y o ﬀ is
αA +( 1− β)B +
1
2
[A + B − A − B] − a (2)
and B’s payoﬀ is
(1 − α)A + βB +
1
2
[A + B − A − B] − b.( 3 )
4Levin and Tadelis [7] take the deﬁning feature of a parternership to be redistribution of proﬁts among the
parteners, we take the deﬁning feature of the integration of ﬁrms to be redistribution of outside option among
the ﬁrms.


































Bb =1 .( 5 )
Since the investments are relationship-speciﬁc, one will expect there will be underinvestment.
Proposition 1 veriﬁes this.
Proposition 1 With 50-50 Nash bargaining between A and B, there is underinvestment under





∗ for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
Proof. It suﬃces to verify aN <a ∗ since the argument for bN <b ∗ is similar. By the
assumption that Aaa and Baa < 0,w ek n o wt h a tt h eA ’ sm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁts both in (1) and (4)
are decreasing functions of a and hence whichever situation gives A higher marginal beneﬁtw i l l




















10Since relationship speciﬁcity of investment is the source of underinvestment problem, one will
expect the degree of relationship speciﬁcity will aﬀect equilibrium investments . Following the
spirit of Chiu [2], we deﬁne what we mean by saying that one organization structure makes one
investor’s investment less (more) relationship-speciﬁc.
Deﬁnition 2 O(α,β) makes A’s (B’s) investment less relationship-speciﬁct h a nO(α0,β
0) does if
α0Aa+(1 − β
0)Ba < αAa+(1 − β)Ba (if (1 − α0)Ab+β
0Bb < (1 − α)Ab+βBb). Conversely,O(α,β)
makes A’s (B’s) investment more relationship-speciﬁct h a nO(α0,β
0) does if α0Aa+(1− β
0)Ba >
αAa +( 1− β)Ba (if (1 − α0)Ab + β
0Bb > (1 − α)Ab + βBb).
In Deﬁnition 2, the degree of relationship speciﬁcity is deﬁned in terms of each invest-
ment’s marginal return in outside options. Since the marginal returns of a under O(α,β) and
O(α0,β
0) are both decreasing functions of a,i fO(α,β) makes an investor’s investment less (more)
relationship-speciﬁct h a nO(α0,β
0) does, then O(α,β) induces higher (lower) investment from this
investor than O(α0,β
0) does. This observation gives us the following partial ordering of organi-
zation structures.
Proposition 2 If O(α,β) makes both A and B’s investments less (more) relationship-speciﬁc
than O(α0,β
0) does, then O(α,β) is more (less) eﬃcient than O(α0,β
0).
Since we have a continuum of organization structures to consider, it is useful to categorize
them and obtain some comparative statics with this categorization. The following deﬁnition
oﬀers a way to measure the degree of separation (integration) of an organization structure.
Deﬁnition 3 O(α0,β
0) is more separated than O(α,β) if α0 > α and β
0 > β. Conversely,
O(α0,β
0) is more integrated than O(α,β) if α0 < α and β
0 < β.
11In addition, the degree of externality matters, too. Deﬁnition 4 categorizes two diﬀerent levels
of externality: When the marginal beneﬁt of one investor’s investment to the other investor
is lower than that to himself, the externality is relatively small; otherwise, the externality is
relatively big.
Deﬁnition 4 A’s (B’s) investment is more productive in her own outside option if Aa >B a
(Bb >A b). A’s (B’s) investment is less productive in her own outside option if Aa <B a
(Bb <A b).
Proposition 3 is one of the main results of this paper that provides a link between externalities
with the boundaries of the ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 If O(α0,β
0) is more separated than O(α,β),t h e nw eh a v e
(a) O(α,β) can not induce higher investments from both A and B if both investors’ investments
are more productive in their own outside option (externalities are small). In particular, O(α0,β
0)
can induce higher investments from both A and B and hence is more eﬃcient if externalities (Ab
and Ba) are small enough.
(b) O(α,β) can induce higher investments from both A and B and hence is more eﬃcient if
both investors’ investments are less productive in their own outside option (externalities are big)
and α0 − α ≤ β
0 − β or if externalities (Ab and Ba)a r eb i ge n o u g h .
Proof. (a) Given the hypothesis, if O(α,β) can induce higher investment from A, then
α
0Aa +( 1− β
0)Ba < αAa +( 1− β)Ba or
(α
0 − α)Aa < (β
0 − β)Ba.
12This implies that (α0 − α) < (β
0 − β) when Aa >B a.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i fO(α,β) can induce higher
investment from B, then
(1 − α
0)Ab + β
0Bb < (1 − α)Ab + βBb
or
(α
0 − α)Ab > (β
0 − β)Bb,
which contradicts with the hypothesis that Bb >A b.I n p a r t i c u l a r w h e n Ab and Ba are small
enough relatively to Aa and Bb, respectively, since α < α0 and β < β
0,w ec a nh a v e(α0 − α)Aa >
(β
0 − β)Ba and (β
0 − β)Bb > (α0 − α)Ab which implies that a(α,β) <a (α0,β
0) and b(α,β) <
b(α0,β
0).
(b) If Aa <B a, Bb <A b and α0 − α ≤ β
0 − β or Ab and Ba are big enough, we have
α
0Aa +( 1− β
0)Ba < αAa +( 1− β)Ba and
(1 − α
0)Ab + β
0Bb < (1 − α)Ab + βBb,
which implies that a(α,β) >a (α0,β
0) and b(α,β) >b (α0,β
0).
Proposition 3 veriﬁes the received wisdom: higher externalities between ﬁr m sf a v o r st h e
integration of them. Intuitively, there are two factors at work in the model: hold-up problem
and investment externality. The former causes underinvestment under all organization structures,
and the latter (somewhat surprisingly) serves as a remedy to the underinvestment problem and
this remedy is better utilized under integration. Integration works best when the there is a strong
remedy to work with.
13The way investment serves as a remedy to the underinvestment problem can understood as
the follows. What integration practically does in this paper is swapping outside options. It
could beneﬁts one party but will certainly hurt the other party, too, if the total revenue is ﬁxed.
However, here the total revenue is a function of the two parties’ investments and hence is not ﬁxed.
When one party’s investment is less productive in the other’s outside option, swapping hurts the
former party’s investment incentives. However, when one party’s investment is more productive
in the other’s outside option, swapping enhance the former party’s investment incentives.
Theoretically speaking, it will be also interesting to characterize the set of investment im-












,w h e r eX =1− 1
2 (Aa + Ba) − 1
2 (Ba − Aa) and Y =1− 1
2 (Ab + Bb)+1
2 (Bb − Ab),t h e na and
b are implementable under O(α(a,b),β (a,b)).
Proof. This is obtained by solving the ﬁrst order conditions ((4) and (5)) for α and β.
Note that, from the previous analysis, the ﬁrst best investment (a∗,b ∗) does not belong to
this set.
142.2.1 Optimal Organization Structure
In this subsection, we treat organization structures as decision variables and see how should the







A(a,b)+B (a,b) − a − b (6)
subject to equation (4), (5), and
α ≤ 1 (7)
β ≤ 1 (8)
By solving the solution a(α,β) and b(α,β) from (4) and (5) and plugging them into the objective






= A(a,b)+B (a,b) − a − b + λ
α (1 − α)+λ
β (1 − β) ,
where λ
α and λ
β are the multiplier for equation (7) and (8) respectively. If α > 0 and β > 0,
the Kuhk-Tucker conditions imply
λ
α =( Aa + Ba − 1)
∂a
∂α





β =( Aa + Ba − 1)
∂a
∂β




,w h e r e∂a
∂α, ∂b
∂α, ∂a
∂β,a n d ∂b
∂β can be obtained by applying the Implicit-Function Theorem to (4) and
(5.) Also when λ
α > 0 and λ
β > 0, the Kuhk-Tucker conditions imply that α∗ = β
∗ =1 ,w h i c h
15means full separation is optimal. Conversely, if some form of integration is optimal (α∗ < 1 or
β
∗ < 1,) it must be that λ
α =0or λ
β =0 . We label this result as Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 If
(Aa + Ba − 1)
∂a
∂α
+( Ab + Bb − 1)
∂b
∂α
> 0 and (Aa + Ba − 1)
∂a
∂β




, full separation is optimal.
Note that from Proposition 1, we know that Aa + Ba − 1 > 0 and Ab + Bb − 1 > 0
2.3 Alternating-oﬀers bargaining
Now assume that A and B bargain under the alternating-oﬀers bargaining structure (as adopted
by Chiu [2] and De Meza and Lockwood [8].) Consider O(α,β),w h e r eα ∈ [0,1] and β ∈
[0,1]. Under the current bargaining structure, A investor’s reservation value will not matter
unless his/her individual rationality constraint binds. We follow the procedure of De Meza and











a,b|αA +( 1− β)B >
1
2





a,b|(1 − α)A + βB >
1
2
[A + B] ≥ αA +( 1− β)B
¾
.
5|J| is positive when Aaa <A ab = Aba < 0, Abb <A ab = Aba < 0, Baa <B ab = Bba < 0, Bbb <B ab = Bba < 0.
When Aab > 0 and Bab > 0,t h e n ∂a
∂α, ∂b
∂α > 0 and ∂a
∂β, ∂b
∂β < 0.I ts e e m st h a t( 9 )a n d( 1 0 )w i l ln o th o l d .B u tt h e n
the sign of |J| is not necessary positive. So (9) and (10) are ﬁne
16In R0 (α,β), none of A and B’s individual rationality constraint binds. In RA (α,β),A ’ si n -
dividual rationality constraint binds but B’s does not. In RB (α,β), B’s individual rationality
constraint binds but A’s does not. A and B’s payoﬀs now are respectively
−a +

      
      
1
2 [A + B] if (a,b) ∈ R0 (α,β)
αA +( 1− β)B if (a,b) ∈ RA (α,β)




      
      
1
2 [A + B] if (a,b) ∈ R0 (α,β)
A + B − (αA +( 1− β)B) if (a,b) ∈ RA (α,β)
(1 − α)A + βB if (a,b) ∈ RB (α,β)
Without loss of generality we assume that B’s outside option never binds so we can ignore
t h ec a s eo f(a,b) ∈ RB (α,β) and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium can be one of the following
two possibilities: (a0,b 0) ∈ R0 (α,β) and (aA,b A) ∈ RA (α,β).I ti ss t r a i g h tf o r w a r dt os e et h a t




[A + B] − a,




[A + B] − b,
aA =a r g m a x
a αA +( 1− β)B − a,a n d
bA =a r g m a x
a A + B − αA − (1 − β)B − b.
The boundary between R0 (α,β) and RA (α,β) is determined by the following equation:
1
2
[A(a,b)+B (a,b)] − αA − (1 − β)B =0 . (11)





2 [Aa + Ba] − αAa − (1 − β)Ba
1
2 [Ab + Bb] − αAb − (1 − β)Bb
(12)
For simplicity, we will make the following assumption.
Assumption: db
da < 0.6
Under this assumption, the boundary between set RI
0 and RI
A is downward sloping. Note we






where MBA0 = 1
2 [Aa + Ba] is the marginal beneﬁt of A’s investment when A’s outside option
is not binding, MBAA = αAa +( 1− β)Ba is the marginal beneﬁt of A’s investment when A’s
outside option is binding, MBB0 = 1
2 [Aa + Ba] is the marginal beneﬁt of B’s investment when
A’s outside option is not binding, MBBA =[ Ab + Bb]−αAb −(1 − β)Bb is the marginal beneﬁt
of B’s investment when A’s outside option is binding. In the following analysis, we focus on
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium in the following two instructive cases:7
Case 1: MBA0 − MBAA > 0 and MBBA − MBB0 > 0 for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
Case 2: MBA0 − MBAA < 0 and MBBA − MBB0 < 0 for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
It is easy to see that bA >b 0 (since MBBA >MB B0)a n da0 >a A (since MBA0 >MB AA)i n
Case 1 and that bA <b 0 (since MBBA <M B B0)a n da0 <a A (since MBA0 <M B AA)i nC a s e
2. We label this result as Lemma 1.
6This assumption holds whenever 1
2 > φ and entails the same eﬀect as the assumption 4 of De Meza and
Lockwood [8].
7We ignore any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium since it does not entails any qualititative change in the results.
18Lemma 1 In Case 1, the binding of A’s outside option will decrease A’s investment and increase
B’s investment. In Case 2, the binding of A’s outside option will increase A’s investment and
decrease B’s investment.
Chiu [2] and De Meza and Lockwood [8] point out that ownership might be bad for investment
incentives. Proposition is analogous to this result because it says that outside recognition can
causes a employee’s outside option to bind and decrease his/her investment.
Proposition 1 of the previous section shows that there is always underinvestment regardless
the ownership structure when A and B bargain under Nash bargaining structure. This is due
to the hold-up problem, and changing the bargaining structure to alternating-oﬀer bargaining
should not change this qualitatively. Proposition 6 veriﬁes this.
Proposition 6 If A and B bargain with alternating-oﬀers bargaining structure, there is under-
investment under any organization structure O(α,β). That is if aT and bT are the equilibrium





∗ for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that the highest investment of A is a0 in Case 1 and aA in
Case 2. The fact that aT <a ∗ can be obtained by an argument similar to Proposition 1’s proof.
The proof of bT <b ∗ is analogous.
In comparing any change of organization structure, one of the major concern is whether the
change will cause an investor’s (A’s) outside option to bind which will cause a discrete jump or
fall in the investor’s investment. To be more speciﬁc, for any two organization structures O(α,β)
19and O(α0,β
0) if A’s outside option is binding under O(α0,β
0) but not under O(α,β),t h e nw e
k n o wf r o mL e m m a1t h a tO(α0,β
0) induce higher investment from A and lower investment from
B in Case 1 and induce lower investment from A and higher investment from B in Case 2.
If A’s outside option is binding under both O(α,β) and O(α0,β
0), then A’s payoﬀ is αA +
(1 − β)B−a and B’s payoﬀ is A+B−(αA +( 1− β)B)−b.I nt h i sc a s e ,O(α,β) induce higher
investment from A than O(α0,β
0) does if and only if αAa +( 1− β)Ba > α0Aa +( 1− β
0)Ba,
O(α,β) can induce higher investment from B than O(α0,β
0) does if and only if αAb+(1− β)Bb >
α0Ab +( 1− β
0)Bb.
If A’s outside option is not binding under either O(α,β) or O(α0,β
0),t h e nA ’ sp a y o ﬀ is
1
2 [A + B] − a and B’s payoﬀ is 1
2 [A + B] − b. In this case, the boundaries of the ﬁrm does not
matter since α and β do not enter either A or B’s payoﬀ function. Proposition summarizes the
above results.
Proposition 7 Given any two organization structures O(α,β) and O(α0,β
0),
• If A’s outside option is binding under O(α0,β
0) but not under O(α,β),t h e nO(α,β) induces
higher investment from A and lower investment from B than O(α0,β
0) does in Case 1, and
O(α,β) induces lower investment from A and higher investment from B than O(α0,β
0) does
in Case 2.
• If A’s outside option is binding under both O(α,β) and O(α0,β
0),t h e nO(α,β) induce
higher investment from A than O(α0,β
0) does if and only if αAa +( 1− β)Ba > α0Aa +
(1 − β
0)Ba, O(α,β) can induce higher investment from B than O(α0,β
0) does if and only
if αAb +( 1− β)Bb > α0Ab +( 1− β
0)Bb.
20• If A’s outside option is binding under neither O(α,β) nor O(α0,β
0), then boundaries of the
ﬁrms does not matter.
3 Relational Contracts
In the previous two sections, we assume that neither the outputs (A and B) nor the investments
(a and b) are contractible, in the sense that they can not be veriﬁed by a court. However, in a
repeated relationship, a desirable investment level by one party might be enforced by the threat
of future punishment from the other party. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] refer to these type of
contracts as ‘relational contract’ and showed that assets ownership matters when the investment
game is repeated and parties can sign relational contracts. In this section, we extend their results
under the new deﬁnition of the ﬁrm.
Denote USA(a,b,α,β) ≡ αA+(1 − β)B+1
2 [A + B − A − B] and USB (a,b,α,β) ≡ (1 − α)A+
βB + 1
2 [A + B − A − B] a st h es p o t( w h e nt h ei n v e s t m e n tg a m ei sn o tr e p e a t e d )g r o s sb e n e ﬁt
of A and B, respectively. For any given O(α,β), the equilibrium investment levels are aS and
bSmaximize (2) and (3)8, i.e.
a
















Note that we change the superscript here from N to S to represent spot contracts.
When the investment game is repeated, a relational contract can be written on any variables,
8Here we ignore the case of alternating-oﬀer bargaining.
21in particular the outputs (A and B) and investments (a and b), that are observable to both
parties. So we can focus our analysis on any division of the total surplus, i.e. any pair of payoﬀ




























Note that URA (a,b) and URB (a,b) are a prior independent of how the boundaries of the ﬁrm
is set up.
In accordance with Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1], we assume that after renege, the two
parties lives under spot governance with the optimal ownership structure O(α∗,β
∗),d e ﬁned











≡ USB∗, respectively. As a result, the condition for A to





























































































where the LHS is the net present value of the total future punishment if some party reneges and









URA − t,URB + t
¢
satisﬁes both (13) and (14), it is without loss of generality to focus on (15) as a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a relational contract to be feasible.
The major results of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] are that (i) asset ownership will aﬀect
the feasibility of relational contracts and (ii) the ability to use relational contract does not implies
one ownership structure (say integration) always dominates another (say non-integration.) In
this section two analogous results are obtained under the new deﬁnition of the ﬁrm.
First, by examining (15) we know that organization structure aﬀect the total temptation to
renege which in turn determines the feasibility of a relational contract. This straightforward
result is analogous to (i) and labeled as Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 Whether a given relational contract is feasible depends on the underlying orga-
nization structure.
23To see that relational contracts can not mimic spot bargaining, consider implementing aS (α,β)
and bS (α,β) under O(α0,β
0) where α 6= α0 or β 6= β
0. The only way to do this is to set
URA (a,b)=USA¡
aS (α,β),b S (α,β),α,β
¢
and URB (a,b)=USB ¡
aS (α,β),b S (α,β),α,β
¢
.














































which is nonnegative. So (15) will not hold. This result is summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 Spot bargaining under one organization structure can not be mimiced by relational
contracts under another organization structure. Technically, if α 6= α0 or β 6= β
0 then a∗ (α,β)
and b∗ (α,β) can not be equilibrium under O(α0,β
0) even when relational contracts is allowed.
4C o n c l u s i o n
By introducing a new deﬁnition of the ﬁrm, we extend the framework of the property-rights
approach to the theory of the ﬁrm to establish a new theory that puts people at the center of
the ﬁrm. The new deﬁnition totally ignore tangible, physical assets and view people who work
in close relationship so that external market can not distinguish them individually as a ﬁrm.
24This new deﬁnition explain the merger of human-capital intensive ﬁrms such as professional
service ﬁrms. We also rediscover the role of externalities in determining boundaries of the ﬁrms.
While we use human-capital intensive ﬁrms to motivate, the result of this paper also apply to
physical-capital intensive ﬁrms, too. The ﬁrms deﬁned in the paper may look diﬀerent from
legally deﬁned ﬁrms. This is because it is diﬃcult to deﬁne in terms of intangible items such
as outside identiﬁcation addressed in this paper. We believe the new deﬁnition captures new
aspects of the ﬁrm. We hope the simplicity of the model makes it easier to extend to future
works. One important issue that is not addressed in the current paper is what happens when
people compete for outside identiﬁcation. We hope to analyze this question in future research.
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